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Abstract—Stress Tests are conducted by national supervisors as 
well as by the European Banking Authority (EBA). This paper 
aims to make a critical analysis of the latest edition of the stress 
tests published on 15
th
 July 2011. To achieve this objective, I have 
also established a secondary aim: to examine the financial and 
patrimonial situation of some of the European and Spanish banks 
in the period 2010-2012, taking into account the relevant EBA 
index.  
Keyword: Stress Test, Banking, European Banking Authority 
(EBA), solvency 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The latest edition of the stress tests was published on 15th 
July 2011 (Article 35 (2) (b) of the EU Parliament and Council 
Regulations Nº 1093/2010, dated 24th November 2010). These 
resistance tests are designed and developed by the EBA, along 
with national banking supervisors (in our case, the Bank of 
Spain), the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank. Their aim is to assess the ability of the European 
banking system to withstand adverse scenarios, and thus lend 
transparency to the market, as well as establishing the 
additional capital required to ensure the solvency of the 
banking sector and its components in stressful scenarios. 
One new feature I can point out, as regards the 2010 
analysis, is the strengthening of the methodology of exercise, 
including macroeconomic assumptions, definitions of Core 
Tier 1 Capital and the ratio threshold (5% as opposed to a 
solvency ratio of 6% in 2010). 
Significant stress scenarios were taken into account in the 
evolution of the banking system’s balance sheets by assessing 
the effects of a substantial increase in the risk premium in 
individual funding costs for each entity. 
The European Commission designed, for this latest edition, 
a macroeconomic profile to calibrate the Spanish banking 
system's capacity to withstand the following adverse scenarios: 
- Reduction in economic activity measured by a decrease of 
1% in GDP for the year 2011 and 1.1% for the year 2012 
(2.1% in cumulative terms). 
- Predicted negative evolution of property prices in the 
period December 2010 to December 2012 of: 
+ Residential property: - 21.9% 
+ Commercial property (including land): - 46.7% 
- Sudden fall in stock market index of 20.7 %  
- Unemployment rate of 21.50% 
- Increase in the cost of long-term public debt of 165 basis 
points (in other words, the stress tests have been performed 
assuming that the long-term rates in Spain would be around 
6.5%). 
In any case, these stress tests are theoretical predictions 
based on statistical simulations, and so should not be 
considered as economic forecasts. At this point, therefore, it is 
worth remembering that Stress Tests are not forecasting 
applications, and consequently these models are more like the 
antithesis of the financial instability [1], as they have been 
designed for conditions that do not involve severe 
macroeconomic shocks. The 2011 Stress Tests were carried out 
taking into account the static, unchanging balances in the 
period analyzed, and therefore the initial data on which the 
estimates are based are the balance sheets at the end of 31st 
December 2010. 
II. EBA  REFERENCE  POINTS FOR IMPLEMENTING STRESS 
TESTS 
Before developing this point, we must take into account a 
basic issue of the possible ways there are of processing 
information, such as the commonest and most accurate 
software used for empirical analysis in the fields of IT and 
social sciences. 
 
Scenario map models are processes in which a wide 
variety of tools and stages are used. Basically, there are two 
kinds of processes of these types of models, "bottom-up" and 
"top-down". In the second category, the supervisor evaluates 
the internal models of each bank to process the information. 
 
A combination of the two was used in the 2011 edition of 
the Stress Tests by the EBA as well as in other initiatives, such 
as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) or the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009). 
A. Sovereign  Debt and Corporate Financing in the 
Investment Portfolio  
As far as fundamental credit analysis is concerned, the risk 
was assessed using one of the following two methods: 
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- IRB Methodology (Basel), adapted to EBA norms, in 
which each banking organization must assess these types of 
scenarios based on the evolution of the probability of default 
(PD) for its loss given default (LGD) and carried out through 
two possible approaches, unexpected losses (UL) and expected 
losses (EL). 
- Standard Method: like the Basel provisions, banks base 
their analysis and valuation on rating established by the ECAI. 
Depending on the starting qualification level, the following 
options could be used to evaluate the rating: 
* AAA / Aaa: rating would be unchanged  
* AA / Aa2 to A- / A3: rating would be lowered two 
categories. 
* BBB + / Baa1 or less: rating would be lowered four 
categories with minimum (CCC or junk bond). 
In Spain’s case, in particular, the sovereign debt rating 
according to the different agencies was, at that time, as follows: 
* Moody's: Aa2 with a negative outlook. 
* Standard & Poor's: AA with a negative outlook. 
* Fitch: AA +: with a negative outlook. 
A guide provided by the European supervisor EBA (2011) 
quantified the impact of sovereign debt on the investment 
portfolio, stating that the worst case scenario (the lowest rating, 
CCC, or equivalent) would involve significant assumptions 
based on corporate standards with a default probability of 
around 36.5%. 
B. Increases in Sovereign Debt Exposure in  the Trading 
Portfolio 
After reading the EBA review, the most striking cases were 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and, to a lesser degree, Cyprus. As far 
as Spain is concerned, the EBA did not alter the initially 
established rating, which in the author’s point of view was an 
error, because only a few months later, the markets changed the 
main points of this approach. 
III. BASIC ECONOMETRIC PRINCIPLES TO TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT  
It is very important to bear in mind that Stress Tests are 
based on non-linear models [3] y [4] and their econometric 
support is weak. The reason for this assertion lies in the fact 
that these models do not record satisfactorily the effects of 
episodes of stress. Linear models, to be exact, tend to show 
responses to such eventualities [5], but the degree of trust is 
extremely limited: the relevant episodes (in the present case of 
a macroeconomic profile designed by the EBA) are rarely 
completely covered and are therefore inconsistent. That is the 
reason why models tend to show inaccuracies precisely during 
episodes of stress. 
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF KEY STATICSTICS IN THE 
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM EXAMINED BY THE STRESS TESTS 
A. Preleminary notes on the state of solvency and financial 
management in the Spanish Financial System 
Before discussing the statistical analysis of the results of the 
Stress Test, I will analyze the usual ratios in the banking 
industry. As reference, we will cite two different sources from 
the Consolidated Balance Sheet of Credit Institutions of Spain, 
as well as Banking Supervision Records from the Bank of 
Spain (2007) to 2010), [2], [6] y [7]. For this analysis, the 
comparative table is shown below for the years 1985 to 2010. 
TABLE I.  SOLVENCY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT RATIOS OF THE 
SPANISH CREDIT SYSTEM 
31/12/2010
29/11/1985 30/04/1996 31/12/2000 31/05/2006 31/03/2008 31/12/2010 + Recapitalization
           Net Equity
       Total Liabilites
       Total Liabilities
       Net Equity
 Total Liabilities
 Total assets
Net Equity
Total assets
93.60%
NET EQUITY RATIO
x100 8.72% 9.08% 7.05% 7.43% 7.36% 5.62% 6.40%
16.79 14.61
PASSIVE RATIO
x100 91.28% 90.92% 92.95% 92.57% 92,64% 94.38%
LEVERAGING
10.47 10.02 13.18 12.46 12,59
8.03% 7.94%
SOLVENCY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT RATIOS
SOLVENCY RATIO
x100 9.55% 9.98% 7.59% 5.95% 6,84%
 
Compiled by the authors from the Bank of Spain Banking Supervision Records and the Manual of 
the Spanish Financial System (CALVO, J, 2010) 
From the above table, it can be deduced, among other 
points, that: 
1. - In 1985, the Spanish credit system had a solvency of 
9.55%, and went on to raise this level to nearly 10% in 1996. 
Between 2000 and 2008, it remained at around 8%; however, at 
the end of 2010, it fell to 5.95%. We must remember that these 
solvency ratios, from the general public’s perspective, and even 
more so from clients, investors and the State’s point of view, 
were not exactly ideal: only 5.95% of equity and 94.05% of 
external funds does not exactly reflect a situation of "solvency" 
for an organization belonging to the financial sector. 
2. – The leverage of the Spanish financial system in 1985 
and 1996 was rated at around 10. Already in 2000, this 
indicator rose significantly to stand at 13.18, showing that debt 
was gaining ground in the economic balance. However, from 
2006, this figure improved and settled at around 12.5. 
However, in 2010, it rose again to 16.79, which shows that 
equity itself had lost prominence at the expense of debt. 
Therefore, if we take the first scenario as a reference point and 
compare it with the year-end 2010, the credit system had 
increased its leverage significantly. 
3. – As for the ratio of liabilities in the year 1985, for every 
€ 100 of economic structure of the Spanish credit system 
balance, borrowed funds accounted for € 91.28 of that figure, 
and remained in the range of € 90-92.6 for the period 1996 to 
1998. However, at the end of 2010, for every € 100 of assets, € 
94.38 was financed by external sources. 
4. - Finally, as regards the net equity ratio, starting at 
figures of around 9% until 1996, this ratio shows us that the 
equity financed total investment in 2000 at a rate of € 7.05 for 
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every € 100; and 10 years later, this occurred at a rate of € 5.62 
in € 100. The ratio also indicates that for every € 100 of total 
financial structure in 2000, € 7.05 was equity in 2000 and a 
decade later, € 5.62. This means that the participation of debt in 
the financial structure is becoming greater and greater. It must 
also be remembered that this ratio also shows unmistakable 
signs of weakness. 
B. Data Source for Statistical Analysis of Stress Test Results 
Results of the stress tests can be viewed on the EBA 
website, with a sample of Spanish banks EBA (2011 a). A 
statistical analysis of this data is shown below, taking into 
account the solvency ratios with different elements of loss 
absorption. 
C. Regulatory Capital Reconciliation and Extraction of Core 
Tier 1 
It should be noted that these stress tests were implemented 
on the basis that banks, savings banks and SIPs were able to 
strengthen their balance sheets during the first four months of 
the year 2011 by increasing their capital and obligatory 
restructuring plans. 
 
The Spanish banking system made significant increases in 
equity before the end of April 2011 to ensure its resilience in 
the EBA stress tests of that year. In the Spanish banking 
system sample analyzed, equity was increased by € 41,208 
million. This was achieved by different means: Ordinary 
Capital gains (Common Equity) derived from RDI 2/2011, 
private market funding, general provisions, convertible bonds, 
divestitures or capital gains, in the following way: 
 
- Ordinary Capital increases (Common Equity) derived 
from RDI 2/2011 to the value of € 14,472 million.  
 
- Amounts derived from general provisions up to 
December 31, 2010 of € 17,752 million. 
 
- Convertible bonds and other instruments amounting to € 
9,164 million. 
 
Equity, as measured by the estimated regulatory capital 
according to the definition of the EBA to December 2010, for 
the sample we analyzed, amounted, in the baseline scenario, to 
€ 139,863 million (Core Tier 1 of 7.4% of the sum of 
weighted assets based on static balance in an unstressed 
scenario, amounting to € 1,900,519 million). 
 
After discounting the net damage or surpluses and the 
effects of dividends and other items, we arrive at a net 
regulatory capital in absolute terms amounting to € 130,064 
million. 
If we add to this figure the RDI 2/2011 capital of € 14,472 
million or capital increases, equity for the sample tested in the 
stressed scenario would amount to € 144,536 million (Core 
Tier 1 of 7.3% of € 1,991,274 million). We can illustrate this 
in the table below, which shows the figures discussed above: 
 
TABLE II.  RECONCILIATION  OF REGULATORY CAPITAL IN THE 
BASE AND STRESS SCENARIOS 
I REGULATORY CAPITAL (SCENARIO NOT STRESSED: 31-12-2010) 139,963
II.- Net Deterioration -13,598
III.-Dividends & others 3,799
IV. -Regulatory Capital without RDL 2/2011 and with no increases in capital * (I+II+III) 130,064
V.- Increase in capital dervied from RDl 2/2011 + private emissions 14,472
VI.- REGULATORY CAPITAL IN STRESSED SCENARIO WITHOUT RDL 2/2011 OR INCREASES OF CAPITAL (IV+V) 144,536
* Includes emissions of capital and debentures converted during the period of stress, where the decision was taken between 01.01.2011 and 30.04.2011.
REGULATORY CAPITAL RECONCILIATION IN BOTH SCENARIOS
In millions of euros
 
Compiled by the authors from EBA information 
The addition of the sample considered would evolve in the 
following way: starting from a solvency as measured by Core 
Tier 1 of the initial stage at the year-end 2010 of 7.4%, it 
would decrease to 7.3% in a stressed scenario two years later 
(a fall of 0.1%). 
The volume of final Regulatory Capital, as defined by the 
EBA, would be € 171,271 million, a figure which represents a 
Core Tier 1 of 8.6% of the € 1,991,274 million weighted 
assets mentioned above. The table below illustrates the 
different factors involved in obtaining the final Regulatory 
Capital. 
TABLE III.  OBTAINING THE FINAL REGULATORY CAPITAL 
I.- Regulatory capital without RDL 2/2011 or increases in Capital 144,536
II.- General provisions * 17,572
III.- Regulatory capital with general provisions (I+II) 162,108
IV.- Divestments and other business decisions up to 30.04.2011 2,483
V.- Other mandatory convertible bonds 5,417
VI.- Others 1,264
VII.- Regulatory capital as of Dec 2012, with other elements which absorb losses (III+IV+V+VI) 171,272
In millions of euros
OBTAINING THE FINAL REGULATORY CAPITAL 
 
Compiled by the authors from EBA information 
In addition, risk assets (the denominator of Core Tier 1) 
would rise from € 1,900,519 million in an unstressed baseline 
scenario to € 1,991,274 million in the adverse scenario (a rise 
of 4.8%). This increase is particularly important in light of the 
rationale used by the EBA for considering balance in static 
terms, which leads to zero growth in nominal terms. 
Moreover, it should be noted that this increase in RWA is 
basically due to the change in valuation of assets of credit risk 
(IRB approach) and in particular because of assets which are 
considered to have failed. 
 
In this adverse scenario, there would be 7 financial 
institutions with a Core Tier 1 in the range of 5-6%. 
 
While the aggregate capital shows an average well above 
the 5% threshold even in a stressed scenario, the dispersion, in 
the case of financial institutions in the analyzed sample, shows 
quite different results, with a considerable degree of 
dispersion. 
 
If we apply the Core Tier 1 differential to both scenarios 
(baseline and stressed), the following conclusions can be 
reached: 
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1. The largest negative differential would be that of BBVA 
and Banca March, which would accumulate a -1.3 percentage 
point difference, which would indicate that despite the impact 
of the macroeconomic table designed by the EBA, they would 
improve their solvency as measured by Core Tier 1. 
 
2. At the other extreme would be Colonya-Caixa: what is 
most noticeable is the baseline scenario with a Core Tier 1 of 
11.2% from 6.2% in the stressed scenario, which would mean 
a loss of solvency of 500 basis points. Another entity that 
shows a decline in solvency in these circumstances would be 
Banco Pastor, by 4.3% (we should remember they have 
already been absorbed by Banco Popular). 
 
V. EUROPEAN BANKS, A CASE STUDY: DEXIA 
What happened in 2011 to the French-Belgian bank Dexia 
has a special relevance. Here below there is an analysis of its 
capital structure, its risk and its solvency. 
First, solvency will be analyzed through the Core Tire 1 
(expressed in millions of euros) in EBA base and stress 
scenarios (2011 d). The analysis uses the Core Tier 1 ratio: 
 
                      Tier 1 Ordinary Capital or Basic Capital  
Core Tier 1= ------------------------------------------------------- 
                                Risk-weighted Assets (RWA)  
 
                                17,002 
December 2010 = ------------- x 100                      12.1 % 
                               140,835 
                                  15,204           
December 2012 = -------------- x 100                     10.4 % 
                                146,439 
However, in order to analyze the situation in greater detail, 
the attached table shows the different components of this 
financial entity’s capital up to 30 June 2010, compared with the 
same period of 2011, by cumulative quarterly periods (latest 
data provided 30/06/2011) by Dexia and CreditSights (2011): 
TABLE IV.  RECONCILIATION OF DEXIA CAPITAL 
 30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
I   BASIC CAPITAL 14,426 18,635 18,743 18,903 18,852
II  Minority participations 679 663 660 645 644
III  Deduction of trading fund and other intangible assets -1,941 -2,169 -2,262 -2,422 -2,492
IV  Regulatory adjustments -139 -139 -139 -139 -139
V  CORE TIER 1 (I+II+III+IV) 13,025 16,990 17,002 16,987 16,865
VI  Hybrid debt/capital instruments 1,423 1,452 1,423 1,431 1,351
VII  TIER 1 CAPITAL (V+VI) 14,448 18,442 18,425 18,418 18,216
VIII  Supplementary capital 3,215 3,063 3,417 3,198 3,617
IX  Regulatory adjustments -1,191 -1,250 -1,206 -955 -1,125
X  TOTAL REGULATORY CAPITAL (VII+VIII+IX) 16,472 20,255 20,636 20,661 20,708
Millions of euros
C O N C I L I A T I O N    O F    C A P I T A L
 
Compiled by the authors from  CreditSights and Dexia data 
From the above, it follows that: 
- By 30/06/11, the Core Tier 1 decreased compared with 
the previous quarter by € 3,965 million (down 23.33%). 
- In this case, Total Regulatory Capital fell in the same 
time period by the sum of € 3,783 million (a decrease of 
18.67%). 
The table below analyzes the Risk-Weighted Assets during 
this same period (30/06/2010 to 30/06/2011) provided by 
Dexia and Creditsights, relating them to the capital figures in 
the table above, resulting in solvency ratios which are also 
presented below: 
TABLE V.  RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS AND CAPITAL RATIOS OF 
DEXIA 
30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Credit risk 110,169 125,499 128,240 130,292 135,537
Market risk 7,183 2,983 2,945 3,251 3,298
Operative risk 9,650 9,650 9,650 10,419 10,419
TOTAL RWA 127,002 138,132 140,835 143,962 149,254
30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Core Tier 1 capital ratio 10.3% 12.3% 12.1% 11.8% 11.3%
Tier 1 capital ratio 11.4% 13.4% 13.1% 12.8% 12.2%
Total capital ratio 13.0% 14.7% 14.7% 14.4% 13.9%
Risk-weighted assets (RWA)
C a p i t a l  R a t i o s  
(Millions of euros)
 
Compiled by the authors from  CreditSights and Dexia data 
Therefore, it can be stated that Dexia's solvency was 
affected primarily because the effect of the deterioration of the 
different components of capital exceeded the reduction of the 
risk weighted assets. 
What happened in August 2001 was particularly 
interesting: this entity published quarterly losses as a result of 
the deterioration of its Greek debt portfolio. 
Next, I will analyze its credit risk: this entity on 31/12/2010 
had a direct position of exposure to gross sovereign debt 
amounting to € 56,245 million EBA (2011 c). Of this sum, € 
3,462 million (i.e. 6.15%) was Greek debt, € 1,927m (3.42%) 
Portuguese, € 15,009m (26.68%) Italian and € 1,443m (2.56%) 
was Spanish. 
Even more surprising was the European supervisor EBA 
ruling (2011 b). The sovereign debt rating according to ECAI 
(this brought the possibility of PD default at each step in the 
ECAI ratings which were assigned by the EBA at the time) 
was: 
* Greece:  
- Moody's: B1. 
- Standard & Poor’s: B. 
- Fitch: B+ 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a 
PD of 5.78%.* 
*Italy:  
- Moody's: Aa2, stable outlook. 
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- Standard & Poor’s: A+, negative outlook. 
- Fitch: AA-, negative outlook. 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a 
PD of 0.18%. 
* Portugal:  
- Moody's: Baa1, stable outlook. 
- Standard & Poor’s: BBB-, negative outlook. 
- Fitch: BBB-. 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a 
PD of 1.17%. 
If we analyze the events now with hindsight (the 
publication date of the Stress Test was July 11 and the 
publication date of the company’s losses was 15 August 2011), 
the supervisor undoubtedly made a serious error. In particular, 
the rationale used by the EBA to consider this asset at a fair 
value and not to have accounted for it at market value was a 
mistake. The above statements are supported by the following 
arguments: 
a. - This bank revealed, after bank stress tests, € 10,000 m 
of unrealized losses to date in its trading portfolio, of which € 
7,000m was sovereign debt. This was due primarily to a 
reclassification carried out by the bank on its financial 
situation. We must bear in mind that the assets that any bank 
has in its trading portfolio may lead to losses in recessionary 
periods as a result of their adjustment to a fair value. Banks are 
able to transfer those assets to their investment portfolio and 
avoid future losses, according to the provisions of an 
amendment by the International Accounting Standards Board  
to the International Accounting Standard No. 39: Recognition 
and Measurement and IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures (IASB 2008). 
The above legislation establishes that such transfers 
between trading and investment portfolios as a result of 
unrealized losses (as might be the case of differential market 
value and fair value) must be deducted from the total equity of 
the entity in question (and not on Core Tier 1). It is precisely at 
this point where some of the triggers of the current situation of 
Dexia can be found, since this option was used widely and 
continuously, leading to the situation that its Core Tier 1 
showed robustness when analyzed by the EBA in the Stress 
Test. 
b. – Similarly, we can state that the trigger may have been 
the risk weighting: government debt is not always without risk 
and even more so in the case of the Greek government (with a 
5.78% possibility of default) 
c. – It should be added that the impact on tangible equity of 
this entity was not actually taken into account: it was based on 
total tangible assets, not adjusted assets, as in the case of Basel 
II. The tangible common equity of a bank can be defined as the 
sum of total equity plus the non-controlling participation in the 
subsidiaries, minus mercantile credit and unamortized 
intangible assets. 
Tangible common equity is calculated by dividing tangible 
common equity by risk-weighted assets. In the financial sector, 
this difference in concept and approach may be considerable. 
The table below shows the data from this entity for the period 
30/06/2010 to 30/06/2011, by cumulative quarters, provaided 
by Dexia and CreditSights  (2011): 
TABLE VI.  RATIO OF DEXIA´S TANGIBLE CAPITAL 
 30/06/11 31/03/2011 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Total consolidated assets (millions of euros) 517,747 526,636 566,735 588,054 608,510
RWA/Total consolidated assets 24.5% 26.2% 24.9% 24.5% 24.5%
Consolidated equity; including minority (millions of euros) 8,761 11,453 10,728 10,830 9,331
Tangible Capital Ratio 1.7% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.5%
Core Tier 1 / tangible assets 2.5% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 2.8%
Tangible Capital Ratio / Core Tier 1 capital ratio 16.5% 17.7% 15.7% 15.6% 13.6%
T a n g i b l e   C a p i t a l   R a t i o 
 
Compiled by the authors from CreditSights data 
From the above, it can be deduced that, regarding Tangible 
Capital Ratio, for every € 100 of total assets, including risk-
weighted assets, Dexia had € 1.9% of Tangible Common 
Equity available on 31/12/2010 (and 1.7% six months later). 
What is most striking is not how this coefficient has evolved, 
but its amount, which is clearly lower than the European sector 
average (average of 4%) or the American sector average 
(average ranging from 6% to 7%). 
It is also vital to analyze the relationship between Tangible 
Capital Ratio and Core Tier 1 Capital Ratio, since, as of 
30/06/2011, it stood at 16.5%, which resulted in a low level of 
the highest quality capital among all the equity considered by 
the EBA for the implementation of the Stress Tests. 
Finally, as of September 30th, 2011, other information must 
be added which attests to the weakness of the financial 
institution analyzed and the inadequacy of the solvency ratios 
used by Dexia (2011). At that date, the entity’s balance, € 
412,000 million, was backed by a net equity of as little as € 
1,100 million. However, the Core Tier 1 calculation made at 
the same date produced a score of € 7,800 million, or 9.9%. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the study of the regulations and economic data 
analyzed, it can be concluded that European supervision and 
standards seek to strengthen the foundations of the European 
system and try to implement an improvement in regional 
financial stability. It also pursues the incentive of establishing 
new liquidity standards and tries to avoid accumulation as well 
as leverage in the banks.  
 
However, the application of the Stress Tests may have 
suffered a weaknesses or inconsistencies in the following 
areas: 
 
- Some lobbyists in the industrial sector have argued 
that given the diversity of the sector, the Minimum Total 
Capital Ratio does not apply uniformly to all of them. 
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- It can be stated that there are certain gaps in the basic 
considerations, such as deferred assets or the discount on 
financial holdings in insurance companies. 
 
- It is a fact that, due to the diversity of regulations and 
supervision of domestic banking systems of each country, 
certain differences do exist as regards areas such as preferred 
stock or countercyclical provisions. 
 
- The preponderance of the EBA Core Tier 1, without 
considering other solvency ratios which are very common in 
this sector, such as tangible capital. 
 
- Evaluation criteria followed by the EBA of the 
sovereign debt on the balance sheets in banks, starting from its 
fair value and not updating to their market value at the time of 
the initial estimates. 
 
Since the launching of banking supervision on a 
national level with the birth of the Basel Supervisory 
Committee in February 1974, it can be seen, just as we have 
discussed in section IV-A of this study, that there has been a 
significant decline in the % of Net Equity of the Spanish 
Credit System over total assets. Thus, it fell from levels of 
around 9% in 1985 and 1996, to about half that figure (5.62%) 
in 2010. 
 
It should be added that the aggregate Net Asset Value 
in the year 2010 and the recapitalization estimated by the 
EBA, would reach a level of Equity / Assets which would not 
even exceed the level analyzed in March 2008, when it stood 
at 7.43%, as we have shown, nor even the 1985 records. 
 
Given that Equity constitutes, or at least should 
constitute, a security strip for creditors in general, we can say 
that this basic criterion of solvency has deteriorated.  
 
Therefore, all the financial engineering that the EBA 
proposes is carried out on the basis of a net equity which is 
obviously insufficient. 
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